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 A Proposal to Amend Rule of Evidence 404 To 
Admit "Prior Acts" Evidence in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions 
 
Corttany Brooks* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the first things learned about Omar Mateen, 
the gunman who killed forty-nine people in the 2016 
Pulse nightclub shooting, was that he reportedly abused 
his ex-wife.1 Similarly, Nikolas Cruz, the student charged 
in the Parkland, Florida mass shooting, had a history of 
domestic violence.2 Data on mass shootings from 2009 to 
2015 reveal that “57 percent of the cases included a 
spouse, former spouse or other family member among the 
victims—and that 16 percent of the attackers had 
previously been charged with domestic violence.”3 Studies 
have yet to reveal what explains this correlation.4 
However, one expert opines that domestic violence can 
serve as a “psychological training ground” for more 
serious attacks.5 One argument is that domestic violence 
is more prevalent than people believe, and it often carries 
lesser consequences for perpetrators than other kinds of 
violence.   
                                                   
 
* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, Volume 
7; Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2019; Ohio 
University, B.S. 2015. I would like to thank the dedicated members of 
the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality for their feedback, 
editing, and cite-checking, and my family and loved ones for their 
support. 
1 Amanda Taub, Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic 
Violence Have in Common, N.Y. TIMES, The Interpreter, (June 15, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/world/americas/control-
and-fear-what-mass-killings-and-domestic-violence-have-in-
common.html?module=inline.  
2 Jose Pagliery and Curt Devine, School shooter showed violence and 
mental instability at home, police reports reveal, CNN (February 17, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/16/us/florida-shooter-cruz-
records-police-calls-to-home-invs/index.html.  
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
 
 
182      Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality   [7:1  
 
 
 Individuals who use violence to control their 
intimate partners routinely avoid criminal conviction due 
to the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence cases.6 
This is because domestic violence creates a unique type of 
prosecution where physical evidence may be lacking and 
the victim often refuses to cooperate, recants, or is made 
unavailable.7 Although prosecutors have found ways to 
introduce evidence of prior domestic violence in limited 
circumstances,8 Rule of Evidence 404 generally precludes 
the use of evidence showing prior bad acts by defendants.9 
In this note, I argue that this evidence rule prevents the 
admission of highly probative evidence of prior abuse 
against current or past victims that not only provides the 
essential backdrop to understanding these cases—but also 
can show a defendant’s propensity to batter. This note 
proposes that the state of Indiana recognize the difficulty 
in proving domestic violence cases and adopt a categorical 
exception to the general prohibition on the admissibility 
of prior acts evidence in domestic violence criminal 
prosecutions. 
 This note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides 
background and discusses the difficulties of prosecuting 
domestic violence cases and the current admissibility of 
evidence in Indiana domestic violence criminal 
prosecutions. Part II discusses other approaches to the 
general inadmissibility of character evidence under the 
law, including California’s categorical exception for crimes 
of domestic violence and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
which have adopted exceptions for sexual offenses. Part 
III argues for the application of these other approaches to 
domestic violence prosecutions in Indiana. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
6 See Part I, Section A. 
7 See id.  
8 See Part I, Section B, infra. 
9 See id. 
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I.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE UNDER THE LAW 
 
A. The Difficulties with Prosecuting Domestic 
Violence 
 
 Domestic violence occurs when one intimate 
partner uses physical violence, coercion, threats, 
intimidation, isolation, or emotional, sexual, or economic 
abuse to maintain power and control over the other 
intimate partner.10 There is no one physical act that 
characterizes domestic violence11—punishable crimes 
encompass a continuum of behaviors ranging from 
domestic battery to criminal confinement, sexual abuse, 
strangulation, and homicide.12 These crimes know no 
economic, racial, ethnic, religious, age, or gender limits.13 
Although male victims must be treated with the same 
concern and respect as female victims, women are 
statistically more likely to be abused, and the 
consequences of the violence are more severe.14  
                                                   
 
10 See generally Dynamics of Abuse, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/dynamics-of-abuse (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2018). 
11 Notably, “[C]yberstalking is now a standard part of domestic abuse 
in the U.S.” According to an NPR survey of domestic violence 
shelters, 85% reported working with victims whose abusers tracked 
them through GPS, and 75% reported abusers listening in on them 
remotely using mobile apps. Aarti Shahani, Smartphones are Used to 
Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 
PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/
smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims. 
12 See Dynamics of Abuse, supra note 10; see also IND. CODE § 35-42-2-
1.3 (2017) (domestic battery), IND. CODE § 35-42-3-3 (2017) (criminal 
confinement), IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1 to -9 (2017) (sex offenses), IND. 
CODE § 35-42-2-9 (2017) (strangulation), IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2017) 
(murder).  
13 See Dynamics of Abuse, supra note 10.  
14 The economic effects of violence against women are enormous; 
according to a CDC study commissioned by Congress to quantify 
these effects, the cost of intimate partner violence (including physical 
assault, rape, and stalking) “exceed[s] $5.8 billion each year, nearly 
$4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental health care 
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As women are victims in the majority of intimate 
partner violence incidents with the abusers 
predominately men, this is a gendered phenomenon. At 
least one in three women experience physical or sexual 
violence at the hands of an intimate partner, and half of 
all murdered women are killed by a current or former 
intimate partner.15 More than 90% of female intimate 
partner rape and sexual violence survivors reported their 
perpetrators as male.16  
 Moreover, although these crimes can and do occur 
independently, they often occur jointly, committed by the 
same perpetrator against the same victim.17 In order to 
understand the dynamics of a particular case, it is 
essential to understand the broader continuum of violence 
in which these cases occur.18 
 Violence against women was not consistently 
recognized as a social problem until attention was focused 
by the feminist reformers of the 1970s.19 What was 
previously dismissed by society as a “private matter” 
became recognized as domestic and eventually expanded 
to intimate partner violence.20 As social attitudes towards 
                                                   
 
services. The total costs of [intimate partner violence] also include 
nearly $0.9 billion in lost productivity from paid work and household 
chores for victims of nonfatal violence and $0.9 billion in lifetime 
earnings lost by victims of [intimate partner homicide].” DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, 2 (2003).  
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, iii, 3, 10, 13 (2000). 
16 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE 
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 24 (2010).  
17 See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) 
(discussing two components of Walker's battered woman syndrome 
theory, the “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness,” used to 
explain the phenomenon of ongoing domestic violence). 
18 See id. 
19 See Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, And Absent Victims: The 
Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and 
Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 143 (2010).  
20 See id. Beating one’s wife, known as the right of chastisement, was 
long condoned by the common law. Yet, when the common law right 
of chastisement was abolished, the case law developed doctrines that 
continued effectively to shield domestic violence from public 
intervention (e.g., marital privacy and inter-spousal tort immunity); 
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family violence progressed, domestic violence became not 
only a social problem, but also a crime.21 Before pressure 
from activists, there were no battered women’s shelters or 
rape crisis policies, no studies on the frequency of spousal 
abuse or rape, and no discussion of sexual harassment in 
the workplace.22 In the years that followed these 
reformers, society has seen increased awareness of the 
harm caused by intimate partner violence, lawsuits by 
citizens against police departments for failure to protect 
them from such violence,23 and “changing social attitudes 
towards gender roles and the relationship between the 
sexes.”24 Consequently, “domestic violence is now studied 
by many disciplines (criminology, psychology, sociology, 
gender studies, and law) and is treated much more 
seriously by the legal system and by society as a whole.”25  
 Despite social progress, convictions for crimes 
related to domestic violence are notoriously difficult to 
secure. Part of the problem stems from “residual 
patriarchal social attitudes about male prerogative [and] 
women’s roles.”26 However, another aspect of the difficulty 
of such prosecutions is lack of physical evidence27 or other 
                                                   
 
see also Reva B. Seigel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150–70 (1996).  
21 See Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143. 
22 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER 
INEQUALITY 95 (1997). 
23 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 
1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53–60 (1992). In the 
70s and 80s major class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of battery 
victims in California and New York. These suits resulted in 
settlement or consent judgments incorporating new policies, including 
pro-arrest mandates and efforts to inform victims of their right to 
obtain civil protective orders and other available services. 
24 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143–44. 
25 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143–44 (discussing additional 
resources for law enforcement and survivors that became available 
under the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, codified in part at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 13701–14040).  
26 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 144. 
27 Many domestic violence victims forgo medical treatment either 
because of the abuser’s demands or because of their own 
embarrassment; when they do seek medical attention, they often lie 
about the cause of their injuries. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY 
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, 
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witnesses and, particularly, the fact that victims often do 
not cooperate. They regularly recant, refuse to testify or to 
appear for depositions, or simply ignore court-ordered 
subpoenas.28 The reasons behind these actions are diverse 
and complicated. A victim of intimate partner violence 
may still love the perpetrator and may not want to get 
him in trouble.29 Alternatively, the victim may feel 
ashamed and be unwilling to testify about abuse that she 
likely blames on herself.30 Victims regularly fear that they 
might lose their children or the ability to care for their 
children because the batterer is their only source of 
housing or income.31 Further, the victim may fear the 
accused and distrust the legal system’s ability to protect 
them from, not only the abuser, but from the abuser’s 
family and friends.32 Because domestic violence is rooted 
in a desire to control, survivors confront an increased risk 
when they attempt to leave their abuser—in fact, the 
moment when a survivor attempts to end the relationship 
is often the most dangerous.33 
 Although it is sometimes simpler to discuss persons 
“of color” as if they constituted a single category, racial 
and ethnic differences can have disparate impact on the 
recorded occurrences of domestic violence. Although 12% 
of the population, African Americans are almost one 
quarter of spousal homicide victims and almost half (48%) 
of the victims of homicide by a dating partner.34 Further 
complicating the effect of domestic violence on this 
community, African Americans can be suspicious of the 
justice system and unwilling to participate in a system 
                                                   
 
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 9, 
14 (2000) (discussing survey results the National Violence Against 
Women Survey, herein “NVAWS”).   
28 See Orenstein, supra note 19, at 144. 
29 See id.  
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 145; see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of 
Battered Women: Redefining the Issues of Separation, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 58 (1991). 
34 FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE tbl.3.2 (2005).  
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that has historically treated Black males 
discriminatorily.35 Latinas are particularly vulnerable to 
domestic violence, for reasons that include limited 
English proficiency, lower levels of educational 
achievement, uncertain immigration, and 
overrepresentation in low-paying jobs.36 Like African 
American women, Latinas are often suspicious of police, 
prosecutors, and judges, who may be culturally distant 
from the community and have acted repressively toward 
it in the past.37  
 In terms of social costs, every time a survivor goes 
to court, they must take time off from work, find childcare 
for children if they are not in school, miss opportunities, 
lose money, and go through the traumatic experience of 
retelling their story again and again.  
 Further complicating these cases is the criminal 
law’s incident-based approach to defining unlawful 
behavior, which is ill-suited to redress the ongoing, 
patterned nature of battering.38 Abusive behavior does 
not occur as a series of discrete events—a more accurate 
description of domestic violence is “premised on an 
understanding of coercive behavior of power and control” 
that takes place on a continuum.39 Because criminal 
prosecution is one of the few processes that can interrupt 
this escalation pattern unique to domestic violence, we 
must be willing to look at patterned behavior during the 
                                                   
 
35 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1253–65 (1993).  
36 See Michelle DeCasas, Protecting Hispanic Women: The Inadequacy 
of Domestic Violence Policy, 24 CHI-LATINO L. REV. 56 (2003).  
37 See Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino 
Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender 
Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 246–50 (1994). Note that 
it is outside the scope of this Article’s purpose to explore all the 
diverse reasons as to why individuals might remain in abusive 
relationships. That said, it is significant to point out that much of the 
academic community continues to ask that same question, focusing 
on the victims of domestic violence, instead of on the batterers. 
38 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm 
of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 959, 964 (2004). 
39 Id. at 965. 
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criminal prosecution, or we neglect our opportunity to 
effectively address the problem at all. 
 
B. The Current Scheme of Admissibility of Evidence 
in Domestic Violence Cases: Crawford through 
Character 
 
 Many prosecutors, facing the reality that victims 
regularly do not cooperate, can use strategic lawyering to 
prosecute “victimless” cases.40 However, such prosecution 
policy depends heavily upon the admissibility of the 
victim’s out-of-court hearsay statements to police and 911 
operators.41  
 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides 
that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”42 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as 
providing various guarantees to criminal defendants, 
including the right to face-to-face presentation of 
witnesses at trial.43 The Confrontation Clause and 
hearsay doctrine have intertwined rules and purposes 
(some evidence that would be admitted under a hearsay 
rule may be excluded by the Confrontation Clause, and 
evidence that would be admitted under the Confrontation 
Clause may be excluded by a hearsay rule).44 
 In the seminal Confrontation Clause case Crawford 
v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
                                                   
 
40 This note is written under the premise of no-drop prosecution 
policies, which I have experienced working in Marion County, 
Indiana. “Evidence-based” prosecutions are those in which “the 
victim's testimony [is] no longer the sole or primary source of 
evidence,” and “no-drop” prosecutions proceed regardless of a victim's 
cooperation. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G. 
GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2008). This Note does not seek to 
address the effectiveness of these policies herein.  
41 Sources of evidence may include: calls from inmates to their victims 
(“jail calls”), 911 calls, photographs, body and in-car videos, excited 
utterances (IND. R. EVID. 803 (2)), and statements for medical 
treatment (IND. R. EVID. 803(4)).  
42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
43 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). 
44 See generally Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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Amendment requires two showings to introduce a 
“testimonial” out of court statement into evidence against 
a criminal defendant: (1) the unavailability of the witness, 
and (2) the prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness,45 overturning a long line of jurisprudence, 
including Ohio v. Roberts.46 Numerous articles followed 
discussing Crawford, often finding the defining of 
“testimonial” statements a difficult and unbalanced 
task.47 In Indiana and across the United States this 
opinion further impeded the prosecution of domestic 
violence cases, where victims are often unavailable for 
cross-examination due to the many reasons 
aforementioned in Part I, Section A. 
 The customary tools of introducing hearsay 
statements in domestic violence prosecutions through 
hearsay exceptions have become severely limited. For 
example, after Davis v. Washington, a post-Crawford 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, if a prosecutor wants 
to admit evidence of a recording of a 911 call when the 
witness is not available for cross-examination, the 
statement must be made when an ongoing emergency is 
present.48 If the statement becomes a narrative and is 
more akin to the victim “testifying” rather than seeking 
help, the statement cannot be admitted.49 While portions 
of 911 calls can still be admitted into evidence under 
Davis, many recordings are excluded if a judge finds the 
emergency ended.50 Further, in Hammon v. Indiana, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that when a responding officer 
arrives, if there is no ongoing emergency, the statements 
                                                   
 
45 Id. at 68.  
46 See 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (finding a two-part interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause as it applies to admission of hearsay: (1) the 
rule of necessity, and (2) the rule of reliability). 
47 See David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and 
How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 117 (2012) (showing that scholars 
have found the decision “generally uncomplimentary, featuring 
descriptions ranging from ‘unstable’ to ‘unspeakable’”). 
48 See 547 U.S. 813, 822–23 (2006). 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
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made to the responding officer are testimonial.51 This 
means that any statement made to an officer who is 
investigating a crime rather than responding to a call for 
help will be held inadmissible if the victim is 
subsequently excluded as a witness.52 
 In addition to these cases, current Indiana evidence 
law generally prohibits the introduction of a defendant’s 
past acts of domestic violence.53 This prohibition affects 
domestic violence prosecutions because domestic violence 
is a highly recidivistic crime,54 and such rules prevent the 
admission of highly probative evidence of prior abuse 
against victims that provides essential context to cases 
and tends to show a defendant’s propensity to batter. The 
Crawford decision and subsequent cases,55 paired with 
Indiana evidence law banning a defendant's prior acts of 
domestic violence admission into evidence, limit the tools 
available to prosecutors in already difficult domestic 
violence prosecutions, which can tip the balance at trial in 
favor of the defendant. 
 The admission of prior acts is governed by Indiana 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which tracks Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) almost verbatim.56 The Indiana rule 
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]vidence of a crime, 
                                                   
 
51 Id. at 822 (reversing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005)). 
52 See Crawford v. State, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
53 IND. R. EVID. 404(b). 
54 See generally Edward W. Gondolf, A 30-Month Follow-Up of Court-
Referred Batterers in Four Cities, 44  J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 111 (2000). Nearly two-thirds (61%) of domestic 
violence recidivism occurred within six months of the previous 
offence, with slightly more than one-third (37%) of the repeat 
victimization occurring within three months. Recidivism occurs 
sooner following the previous offence when using self-reported data 
compared to data collected from official criminal justice statistics. 
55 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; see also Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 
1189 n.2 (Ind. 2004) (noting that Crawford is inapplicable where the 
declarant testifies at trial); but see Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 
464 (Ind. 2005) (affirming that a statement given to police who 
arrived at the scene and began informally questioning those around 
while the victim is still bleeding and crying from domestic violence 
was not testimonial and the evidence fell under the excited utterance 
exception and outside the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford). 
56 IND. R. EVID. 404(b); cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  
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wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion 
the person acted in accordance with the character.”57 
Evidence of prior acts may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of “motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”58 Rule 404(b)’s list of 
permissible purposes is illustrative but not exhaustive.59 
 When assessing the admissibility of 404(b) 
evidence, Indiana courts currently: (1) determine whether 
the evidence of other crimes or wrongs is relevant to a 
matter at issue—other than the defendant’s propensity to 
commit the charged crime; and (2) then balance the 
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial 
effect pursuant to Ind. R. Evid. 403.60 Notably, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana has repeatedly held that a 
defendant’s prior acts of violence or threats of violence are 
“usually admissible” under Rule 404(b) to show the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim, and to 
show the defendant’s motive where the charge is battery 
or murder.61  
                                                   
 
57 IND. R. EVID. 404(b). 
58 Id. 
59 See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220–21 (Ind. 1997). 
60 See id.; see also IND. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”).   
61 E.g., Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997). See also, e.g., 
Spencer v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the 
state’s introduction of three prior batteries by defendant against the 
victim was not an abuse of discretion of the trial court to prove 
identity and motive); Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) 
(explaining defendant’s prior acts are usually admissible to show the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim in cases of 
murder); Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind. 1994) (finding 
appellant’s prior threats and statements concerning the victim 
admissible to show the relationship between the parties and 
appellant's motive, plan, and absence of accident); Price v. State, 619 
N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. 1993) (finding evidence of defendant’s prior 
attacks upon the victim was admissible to show the parties’ 
relationship and defendant’s motive and intent in the commission of 
the crime). 
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 For example, in Iqbal v. State, the trial court 
allowed use of bad acts (a violent relationship with the 
victim) occurring within one year of the victim’s death to 
be introduced, although the State had evidence dating 
back several years.62 In this case, “the evidence was 
relevant to show motive, relationship between the parties, 
and absence of mistake.”63 The court found that the trial 
court had properly balanced the prejudicial effect of the 
prior acts against the probative value by limiting the 
prior acts which could be introduced to those occurring 
within one year of the murder.64 
 Further, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed the 
admission of prior act evidence when defendants claimed 
the victim’s death was accidental. In Crain v. State, the 
Court allowed the admission the defendant's two 
convictions for battery against his wife, in addition to 
evidence of four charges against the defendant for 
battering his wife that were pending at the time of her 
death.65 In light of the defendant's claim that he 
accidentally killed his wife, the Court found these 
instances of prior act evidence admissible under Rule 
404(b) because each was “relevant and probative in that it 
directly involved and shed light on Defendant's 
relationship with [the victim].”66 Moreover, in McEwen v. 
State, evidence of the defendant’s previous battery against 
the victim was admissible under Rule 404(b).67 The Court 
stated “[The prior act evidence] was relevant to show a 
pattern of hostility . . . illustrated the depth of possible 
motive and was also relevant to assessing [the 
defendant’s] claim that [the victim] was stabbed 
accidentally.” 
 Any incident of prior act evidence is nonetheless 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice.68 While these examples 
                                                   
 
62 805 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
63 Id. at 408. 
64 Id. at 408–09. 
65 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1235 (Ind. 2000). 
66 Id. at 1235–36 (citing Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ind. 
2000)). 
67 695 N.E.2d 79, 87–88 (Ind. 1998).  
68 See generally IND. R. EVID. 403. 
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show Indiana is willing to admit prior acts evidence for 
certain purposes, these are often the most gruesome 
batteries and murders. In application, even where victims 
do cooperate, their testimony is limited to the discrete 
incident(s) for which the defendant is charged, and any 
past incidents that would provide context are excluded for 
the fear that the information will lead to the 404(b) 
forbidden inference.69 Current approaches do, however, 
indicate that Indiana courts may be willing to take that 
next step towards a categorical exception for domestic 
violence cases. 
 
C. Problems with the Current Scheme: Why 
Indiana, Why Now?  
 
 Despite increased statewide attention to the 
problem of domestic violence in Indiana,70 reported 
incidents are only increasing. Year-to-year crisis calls are 
on the rise—from about 16,500 in 2010 to 23,000 in 2015 
for central Indiana alone—an average of nearly fifteen 
calls every minute.71 Another side of the problem that has 
received less attention is that most cases of domestic 
violence are unreported—indicating that reported cases of 
domestic violence represent only a small part of the 
problem when compared with prevalent data.72  
                                                   
 
69 See generally IND. R. EVID. 404(b). 
70 For example, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department’s 
(IMPD) predictive policing initiative, Baker One, is a “proactive 
approach to policing that involves identifying individuals at risk for 
perpetrating domestic violence, providing these individuals with 
increased access to supportive services, and promoting a heightened 
system response for incidents involving these individuals.” DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE NETWORK, STATE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL 
INDIANA, 17 (2016). 
71 Id. at tbl.1. For the purposes of this report, Central Indiana is 
defined as Marion County and the eight surrounding counties: Boone, 
Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Johnson, Madison, Morgan, and 
Shelby.  
72JENNIFER TRUMAN, LYNN LANGTON, & MICHAEL PLANTY, OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 
2012, tbl.4 (2012). From 2003 to 2012, only about 55% of domestic 
violence was reported to police. 
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 According to one report, “between 2009 and 2010, 
116 women, children, and men died in Indiana when 
domestic abuse escalated to lethal levels of violence.”73 
Domestic violence deaths were reported in only 38 of 
Indiana’s 92 counties, so these numbers are not 
representative for the entire state.74 The youngest 
identified victim was a seven-month-old baby and the 
eldest was an 80-year-old senior.75 Ninety-one percent of 
homicides attributed to domestic violence during this 
period were perpetrated by men.76 Charges were pursued 
against perpetrators in 52 of the 85 identified incidents.77 
Lastly, of the 52 incidents that resulted in charges, 42 
perpetrators were convicted.78  
By comparison, in 2013, the Marion County 
Prosecutor’s Office reviewed 5,581 domestic violence 
cases.79 Of the cases where charges were filed (both 
felonies and misdemeanors), 59% were dismissed.80 In my 
experience working at this office as a domestic violence 
and sex crimes intern, nearly all dismissed cases are due 
to lack of victim cooperation. 
 Separately, in an Indiana crime victimization 
survey, respondents were asked questions about domestic 
violence including various types of physical violence, 
threats of violence, frequency of violence, whether any of 
                                                   
 
73 INDIANA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW REPORT 2009-2010, 
INDIANA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (herein “ICADV”), 
1.  
74 Id. at 5. Indiana does not have a system for collecting data related 
to domestic violence homicides. The ICADV contacted coroners, law 
enforcement, and shelters to request relevant records. These requests 
for records received approximately a 60% response rate. 
75 Id. at 1. 
76 Id. at 9.  
77 Id. at 13 (“[C]harges were irrelevant in cases where the perpetrator 
committed suicide and were not brought against individuals 
determined to be taking defensive or protective action.”). 
78 Id. at 14 (“[T]hree were found not guilty, sentencing was unknown 
for three cases, three trials were still pending at the time of 
publication[,] and one alleged perpetrator died in incarceration prior 
to trial.”).  
79 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NETWORK, AN UPDATE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MARION COUNTY, IN, 31 (Nov. 
2014). 
80 Id.  
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the incidents were reported to police, and, if not, why the 
crime was not reported.81 Of the 2,500 survey 
participants, 1.8% indicated they were victims of domestic 
violence in the last year.82 When applying this figure to 
the adult population, the potential number of Indiana 
domestic violence victims is 87,759 during the 12-month 
survey period.83  
 Though not fully representative, the numbers 
between potential crimes committed, crimes charged, and 
charges that resulted in meaningful sentences are 
unconscionable.84 National statistics similarly reveal 
under-reporting, under-enforcement, and inadequacy of 
punishment in domestic violence prosecutions that lead to 
conviction.85 Moreover, researchers have indicated that 
current penalties are not effective in the reduction of 
recidivism.86 Studies also reveal simple prosecution does 
not deter further criminal abuse.87 The key to reducing re-
abuse is dependent upon the sentence imposed (for 
example, intrusive sentences, such as jail, work release, 
electronic monitoring and/or probation reduce recidivism 
in domestic violence cases).88 Fines and suspended 
                                                   
 
81 INDIANA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, 2010 INDIANA CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 4 
(2012). 
82 Id. at tbl.2. Domestic violence in the survey was defined as a slap, 
punch, kick or push; hitting with an object; using a weapon; 
threatening with violence or to kill survey respondents. 
83 Id.  
84 This Note acknowledges the difference between charged crimes of 
domestic violence and overall potential domestic violence incidents, 
however, the goal of this section is to provide statistics on the scope of 
this issue in Indiana. See supra note 73.   
85 See generally SHANNON M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU 
OF JUST. STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2003).  
86 See generally Tamika L. Payne, Domestic Violence Recidivism: 
Restorative Justice Intervention Programs for First Time Domestic 
Violence Offenders, WALDEN DISSERTATIONS AND DOCTORAL STUD. 4 
(2017).  
87 See generally Domestic Violence Best Practices, Indiana 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Counsel (herein “IPAC”), available at 
https://www.in.gov/ipac/files/5_-
_DV_Best_Practices_PPP_for_December_10_2014_Suzanne_Karen_a
nd_Jeff(1).ppt.  
88 Id. 
 
 
196      Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality   [7:1  
 
 
sentences without probation resulted in higher re-arrest 
rates.89 Nonetheless, cornered by the unavailability of 
evidence, prosecutors must dispose of many domestic 
violence cases by plea agreements to probation and 
suspended sentences.90 
 There is an epidemic of violence against women, 
and Indiana is no different. To more fully combat 
domestic violence, we must convince lawmakers to adopt 
rules so that the way Indiana criminalizes domestic 
violence reflects the realities of the crime.  
 
II.  OTHER APPROACHES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE UNDER THE LAW 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 To overcome the unique hurdles of prosecuting 
domestic cases, a few states have authorized admission of 
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence for propensity 
purposes. Other states, including Indiana, have expanded 
the availability of non-propensity theories for admitting 
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence. Further, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) have created exceptions 
for admitting specific instances of prior conduct in sexual 
assault and child molestation cases for many of the same 
reasons discussed herein.  
 Since 1997, California Evidence Code (CEC) section 
1109 has provided for admission of evidence of prior acts 
for propensity purposes where the defendant is charged 
with a crime of domestic violence.91 The trial court has 
discretion, however, to exclude such evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by undue 
prejudice.92 That same year, the Alaska legislature took a 
similar step. Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that 
in “a prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence . 
. . evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by 
the defendant against the same or another person . . . is 
                                                   
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109. 
92 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352. 
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admissible.”93 Both states provide procedural safeguards 
for defendants. In addition to the required balancing of 
probative value and prejudice, the other acts evidence 
must be: less than ten years old, similar to the charged 
offense, and have been committed against persons similar 
to the victim in the charged case.94 Both rules have 
withstood due process and equal protection challenges.95  
 Additionally, other states—including Colorado, 
Minnesota, and Kansas—have expanded the non-
propensity theories under which evidence of other acts of 
domestic violence may be admitted.96 For example, 
Minnesota’s statute has been interpreted to allow 
evidence of the history of the relationship between the 
victim and the defendant to explain the context in which 
the charged assault occurred.97   
 The ban on character evidence began to erode in 
sexual assault cases by judge-made law.98 To codify these 
common law exceptions, in 1994 Congress passed FRE 
413 (sexual assault), 414 (child molestation), and 415 
(civil cases involving sexual assault or child 
molestation).99 In criminal prosecutions for sexual assault 
or child molestation, FRE 413 and FRE 414 supersede 
FRE 404’s general prohibition to allow other victims of 
                                                   
 
93 ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b). 
94 ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
95 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, (2000) (due 
process); People v. Jennings, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (2000) (equal 
protection); Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) 
(involving a due process challenge to a different provision); Fuzzard v. 
State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (equal protection).  
96 See Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic 
Violence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at its Past, Present, 
and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1144–48 (2003). 
97 See State v. Waino, 611 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).  
98 Indiana was one of many states that created a common law lustful 
disposition rule, although in Indiana it was termed the depraved 
sexual instinct exception and remains law today. See Lannan v. State, 
600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (discussing the “long settled” 
depraved sexual instinct exception in Indiana); see also Crabtree v. 
State, 547 N.E.2d 286, 288–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing many 
of the ways in which the depraved sexual instinct exception had been 
used in Indiana). 
99 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999).  
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sexual assault or child molestation to testify in cases 
where the instant victim has been sexually assaulted or 
molested by the defendant100—clearly contradicting the 
character evidence prohibition.101 The experiences in 
these states and under the Federal Rules offer guidance 
on whether and how to amend our own rules.102 
 
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Expansion of 
Prior Acts: Evidence Rulings in the Sexual 
Assault and Child Sexual Abuse Contexts 
 
 FRE 404 controls character evidence and its 
admission into court.103 The first part of FRE 404(b) 
states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is 
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”104 The second part of FRE 
404(b) allows admission of evidence of other crimes or acts 
for different purposes, “such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”105 FRE 
413 and 414 allow the admission of “prior convictions, 
similar specific instances[,] or even testimony of previous 
allegations or uncharged actions” when a defendant is 
accused of sexual assault or molestation.106 
 The rationale behind these rules is that character 
evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit acts of 
child molestation or sexual assault is highly probative 
and will enhance the likelihood of an accurate verdict, 
unless deemed too prejudicial on other grounds.107 Thus, 
its supporters argue, FRE 413 and 414 support the 
premise of the FRE, which is “to secure fairness in 
administration . . . and promotion of growth and 
                                                   
 
100 FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a).  
101 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 99, at § 190.   
102 Indiana has not adopted equivalents of FRE 413, 414, or 415. See 
Lannon, 600 N.E. 2d at 98; see also Crabtree, 547 N.E. 2d at 288-89. 
103 FED. R. EVID. 404. 
104 Id. at 404(b)(1). 
105 Id. at 404(b)(2). 
106 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 98, at 650. 
107 Kovach, supra note 96, at 1122–23. 
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development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined.”108 
 Proponents of FRE 413 and 414 also argue that 
“sexual assault [and child molestation] cases are often 
difficult to prove because of the unique circumstances of 
these cases.”109 For instance, sexual assault cases are 
challenging to prosecute because they typically involve 
“he said, she said” testimony between the victims and 
defendants.110 Thus, other acts evidence allowed under 
FRE 413 of the defendant’s other sexual assaults may 
bolster the instant victim’s credibility and lessen the 
chance of a not guilty verdict.111 Finally, supporters 
assured that FRE 413 and FRE 414 contained adequate 
safeguards for the defendant’s procedural rights.112  
 The concern, on the other hand, is that character 
evidence might allow the jury to infer—based solely on 
prior acts evidence—that because the defendant 
possessed the traits and capacity to commit a crime once, 
the same defendant committed the same crime on this 
occasion, and is, therefore, deserving of a guilty verdict.113 
The motivation behind the ban on character evidence 
stems from this fear that its admission prejudices 
defendants and hinders their right to a fair trial. The 
reliability of this type of inference by the jury has been 
                                                   
 
108 Id. at 1123 (citing FED. R. EVID. 102).  
109 See id.  
110 See id. 
111 See id. 
112 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex 
Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 21–24 
(1994) (discussing such procedural safeguards as pretrial disclosure; 
FRE 403’s balancing test still must be applied; FRE 413 is not 
mandatory and still requires that the uncharged act be similar to the 
charged offense; assistance of counsel; right to cross-examination of 
witnesses and to present rebuttal evidence).  
113 FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note (1973). The 
circumstantial use of character evidence is generally questionable 
because it requires the trier of fact to make an inference that the 
defendant acted in accordance with that character at the time in 
question. Id.  
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doubted.114 While this is a fundamental concern, 
exceptions to these rules have highlighted the significance 
of balancing defendants’ rights not only against victims’ 
rights but against legitimate public policy concerns. 
 
C. California’s Expansion of the Admissibility of 
Prior Domestic Violence Acts 
 
 California’s rule admitting other acts of domestic 
violence for propensity purposes is CEC section 1109.115 
Under this section, prosecutors may admit defendants’ 
uncharged acts of domestic violence in their case in 
                                                   
 
114 Lindsay Gochnour, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, but 
Words Will Always Hurt Me: Why California Should Expand the 
Admissibility of Prior Acts of Child Abuse, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 417, 424 
(2016) (“Both psychology and legal scholars have questioned the 
validity of such an inference over the decades following the adoption 
of the general rule.”). 
115 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109. This section reads as follows: Section 
1109. Evidence of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence.  
 (a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal 
action in which the defendant is  accused of an offense involving 
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of  
 other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 
1101 if the evidence is not  inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.  
[ . . . ] 
 (b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this 
section, the people shall disclose the 
 evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses 
or a summary of the substance of 
 any testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance 
with the provisions of Section 1054.7 
 of the Penal Code. 
 (c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the 
admission or consideration of  evidence under any other statute or 
case law. 
 (d) As used in this section, “domestic violence” has the 
meaning set forth in Section 13700 of the 
 Penal Code. “Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult” has the 
meaning set forth in Section 
 15610.07 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
 (e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the 
charged offense is inadmissible under  
this section, unless the court determines that the admission of 
this evidence is in the interest of justice. 
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chief116 for propensity purposes.117 The rule is applicable 
to “prior acts of domestic violence against either the same 
victim or different victims.”118 The rule’s definition of 
domestic violence provides “intentionally or recklessly 
cause or attempt to cause bodily injury, or which place 
another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent 
serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another”—
capturing a number of domestic violence behaviors.119 
 In California, the Penal Code and subsequent case 
law explains why special attention should be devoted to 
the prosecution of batterers:  
 
[I]n domestic violence cases evidence of prior 
acts is particularly probative in 
demonstrating the propensity of the 
defendant . . . because on-going violence and 
abuse is the norm in domestic violence cases. 
Not only is there a great likelihood that any 
one battering episode is part of a larger 
scheme of dominance and control, that 
scheme usually escalates in frequency and 
severity. Without the propensity inference, 
the escalating nature of domestic violence is 
likewise masked.120  
 
CEC 1109 was reasoned necessary by the legislature 
because the ban on propensity evidence in domestic 
violence cases “insulates defendants and misleads jurors 
into believing that the charged offense was an isolated 
                                                   
 
116 See Kovach, supra note 96, at 1133 (citing People v. Poplar, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 320, 324–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). 
117 See id. 
118 See id. (citing People v. Brown, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 437–38 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000)).  
119 See id., at 1133–34 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (a)–(b)). 
120 See, e.g., People v. Cabrera, 152 Cal. App. 4th 695 (2007) 
(upholding the constitutionality of CAL. EVID. CODE, § 1109) 
(“Admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evid. 
Code, § 1109 is subject to the limitations of Evid. Code, § 352. Pen. 
Code, § 1109, subd. (a). This safeguard should ensure that § 1109 
does not violate the Due Process Clause.”). 
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incident, an accident, or a mere fabrication.”121 As such, it 
was enacted to provide a more accurate picture of the 
defendant’s behavior to the jury.122 Further, this 
exception recognizes ongoing abuse as part of a larger 
scheme of power and control—which usually escalates in 
frequency and severity over time.123 
 Following the enactment of these rules, researchers 
conducted surveys and interviews with California 
prosecutors that revealed CEC section 1109 has proved 
“invaluable in convicting recidivistic batterers.”124 This 
research also revealed that the use of prior acts evidence 
for propensity purposes “assists jurors enormously in 
their decision-making process by showing that a person 
with a history of battering is likely to have battered in the 
current offense.”125 This evidence, typically in the form of 
victim testimony, also provides strong corroboration.126 
One prosecutor responded that a defendant sounds 
“‘incredibly foolish’ when arguing that the victim attacked 
him or fabricated the story when the prosecution is able to 
call prior domestic violence victims as witnesses to 
support the instant victim.”127  
 Proponents of CEC section 1109 hypothesized that 
former domestic violence victims would be more willing to 
testify because they are less likely to still fear the 
defendant.128 This prediction proved true in some reported 
instances where past victims testified and afterwards felt 
empowered.129 However, interviews also revealed a 
reluctance by prior victims to testify for current 
victims.130 The reasons for this, again, are complicated 
                                                   
 
121 Kovach, supra note 96, at 1136. 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 1138. 
125 Id. 
126 See id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1139. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
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and varied.131 Another hurdle for prosecutors has been 
locating these prior victims.132  
 Nonetheless, CEC section 1109 is a landmark 
evidentiary tool for prosecutors seeking convictions in 
domestic violence cases and a potential model for 
amending our own rules.  
 
III.  APPLYING OTHER APPROACHES TO DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS IN INDIANA 
 
A. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Are Probative in 
Showing a Batterer Committed the Charged 
Crime 
 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence have recognized that 
certain evidence is admissible in sexual abuse cases to 
show propensity because its probative value is not 
sufficiently outweighed by its prejudicial effect.133 This 
Note argues for the same type of exception in prosecuting 
batterers. Further supporting this inference is research 
suggesting that evidence of prior domestic violence is 
more probative in showing that a defendant committed 
the crime than it is in sexual assault cases because the 
recidivism rate of domestic violence batterers is higher 
than that of sexual abuse offenders.134 
 This is also evidenced by the cyclical nature of 
abuse. Despite underreporting, data collected reveals that 
domestic violence defendants have a high rate of 
recidivism and, over time, domestic violence often 
becomes more frequent and severe.135 The National 
Violence Against Women Survey found that nearly 70% of 
women who had been assaulted by an intimate partner 
                                                   
 
131 See id. (“Often, past victims have invested a significant amount of 
time and effort in leaving the defendant and disengaging from their 
emotional and financial grip, and thus are unwilling to voluntarily 
insert themselves in the defendant’s criminal proceeding.”). 
132 See id. 
133 See generally Part II, Section B.   
134 See Pamela Vartabedian, The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable: 
Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 47 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157, 180 (2007). 
135 See Part I, Section C.   
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reported that their victimization lasted more than one 
year.136 For more than a quarter of the women, the 
victimization occurred over more than five years, and the 
average duration of the violence was four and a half 
years.137  
 Even the language used to describe the experience 
of abuse reflects its cyclical, ongoing nature. We say that 
a woman who has been assaulted by her husband has 
been “battered” or has been subjected to “domestic” or 
“intimate partner violence,” suggesting a general status. 
In contrast, when a person has been assaulted by a 
stranger or casual acquaintance, we say they have been 
“assaulted” or gotten into a “fight,” suggesting a one-time 
act of violence, not a continued phenomenon. 
 Lastly, notable work has been done evaluating 
batterers’ profiles.138 One expert phrased incidents of 
violence as “instrumental” rather than “expressive.”139 By 
this, the expert wants society to understand that “the 
violent episodes are not simply unconnected episodes of 
rage, loss of control, or an inability to manage anger (as 
batterers would like us to believe), but rather that the 
violence is a calculated, purposeful way to control the life 
of an intimate partner.”140 This “system of control” makes 
the propensity inference precisely appropriate in these 
unique crimes.141 Additional studies have shown that once 
a batterer has established a pattern of violence against an 
intimate partner, he is likely to continue “unless there is 
some intervention, such as criminal justice sanctions 
and/or treatment.”142  
 Meanwhile, the current criminal law used to 
prosecute abusers continues to punish only individual 
incidents of threatening or violent behavior without 
opportunity for victims to testify to the context in which 
the charges occurred, ignoring the very nature of the 
crime itself. 
                                                   
 
136 See NVAWS, supra note 27, at 39. 
137 Id. 
138 See Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of 
Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 359, 388 (1996). 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.; see also IPAC, supra note 87. 
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B. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Will Help Jurors 
Evaluate Victim Credibility and Eliminate Juror 
Bias 
 
 Domestic violence cases are also difficult to 
prosecute because of the perceived lack of credibility of 
women as witnesses. The jury (or a judge) makes all 
decisions about the credibility of the witnesses and 
evidence. Yet women, who make up the majority of 
domestic violence victims, are often seen as “less credible” 
witnesses in the criminal justice system.143  
 Further, these bars on evidence leave jurors in 
domestic violence cases with an inadequate basis for 
understanding the full, relevant history of abuse by a 
defendant. This is not to say such history would be 
dispositive of the charged case, but such history is 
essential to placing the charged case within an 
appropriate context.144 “When a single act of violence is 
viewed outside of the broader pattern of abuse in which it 
occurred, jurors lack the context necessary for 
determining credibility and truth.”145 “They may treat the 
case with apathy if they assume that a relatively minor 
confrontation was an isolated incident in an otherwise 
nonviolent relationship.”146 Jurors may write off the case 
as an intoxicated disagreement or as an act of self-defense 
against an out-of-control wife or girlfriend.147 When jurors 
are shielded from the dynamics between a victim and the 
defendant in their intimate relationship, a victim’s 
allegations may sound irrational or even farfetched.148 
 In Indiana, we have already acknowledged that a 
reasonable juror might understandably desire access to 
evidence relevant to a criminal defendant’s relationship to 
his victim or for purposes of motive, intent, or absence of 
mistake. Such jurors effectively recognize—and are 
                                                   
 
143 See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a 
Gender Gap, 34 THE JUDGES J. 5, 5 (1995). 
144 See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and 
Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
552, 573 (2007); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 38 at 980–88. 
145 Burke, supra note 144. 
146 Id. at 574. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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instructed by the trial court—that the defendant must 
ultimately be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the charged offense. 
 
C. Defendants’ Rights Remain Protected  
 
 The most compelling argument against the 
expansion of 404(b) and the admissibility of prior acts in 
domestic violence cases is the same argument that has 
opposed the overall admission of character evidence—it 
would impair defendants’ right to a fair trial. 
 Determining the admissibility of other acts 
evidence in Indiana requires several levels of analysis. To 
admit this evidence, the court must determine that: (1) 
the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to 
a matter at issue, other than the defendant’s propensity 
to commit the charged act; (2) the proponent has 
sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed 
the act did, in fact, commit the act; and (3) the court must 
balance the probative value of the evidence against its 
prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.149 There must be 
sufficient proof from which a reasonable jury could find 
the uncharged conduct proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.150 Direct evidence that the defendant 
perpetrated the similar act is not required; rather, 
substantial circumstantial evidence of probative value is 
sufficient.151  
Under a domestic violence exception, the inquiry 
would still require levels of analysis. In the hearing for a 
prosecutor’s motion to admit other acts evidence, the 
judge will first ensure that the evidence is relevant under 
Rule 401, and therefore generally admissible under Rule 
402. Assuming relevancy, the judge will next decide 
whether there are reasons to exclude the relevant prior 
acts evidence. This balancing analysis under Rule 403 
gives judges the discretion to exclude evidence of prior 
acts if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
any prejudice it would cause the defendant. Additional 
                                                   
 
149 Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009); see also Caldwell 
v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
150 Caldwell, 43 N.E.3d at 264. 
151 Id. 
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restraints in the form of notice requirements, discovery 
rules, and limiting instructions remain mandatory. 
Protecting defendants’ constitutional right to a fair 
trial is an essential and proper part of our criminal justice 
system codified in the Sixth Amendment. The expansion 
of the admissibility of prior acts of domestic abuse would 
not hinder this right. Just as the Federal Rules and other 
states have successfully codified, this proposal provides 
courts discretionary power to exclude any evidence found 
too prejudicial to the defendant—and the trial judge is 
granted tremendous deference in such situations. 
 
D. Time and Efficiency Concerns 
 
 Critics of exceptions discussed in Part II cited time 
and efficiency as reasons to oppose those rules and are 
likely to have the same concerns here. The problem of 
“mini-trials” is often cited by critics.152 They argue that 
each admitted uncharged act will result in a trial within a 
trial due to the lesser standard of proof for admitting 
prior acts evidence.153 By consequence the proceeding is 
prolonged, and the defendant is required to defend their 
entire past, rather than the charged crime. “Defendants 
will likely argue that they did not commit the [prior] acts. 
This, of course, is their right, and they should be given 
adequate time to respond” to any admissible evidence in a 
proceeding,154 which is specifically protected by Rule 404 
notice requirements.  
 These concerns are also abated by the showing 
required to admit such evidence.155 Moreover, it is 
important to note that it is only uncharged acts of 
domestic violence which have been admitted under these 
rules,156 and they do not supersede Rule 609.157 Critics 
further suggest that the admission of this type of evidence 
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confuses juries about the charged crime(s).158 Due to the 
low reporting of these crimes, the low cooperation rate of 
victims, and the often lacking corroborating evidence, it is 
highly unlikely that any one defendant will have many, if 
any, prior acts to defend against, even if they have been 
batterers throughout their life.159 Further, it undermines 
the entirety of these rules to argue that such evidence 
“wastes time.”160 
 
E. Necessity as a Matter of Policy 
 
 Domestic violence is a societal problem; it is not 
just two people in a private relationship working out their 
“family problems.”161 The harm caused by this violence 
impacts everyone—children, neighbors, extended family, 
coworkers, hospital emergency staff, and law 
enforcement.162 The state’s interest in maintaining public 
safety means ensuring that batterers are not allowed to 
remain unabated.163 When prosecutors pursue these 
charges and secure meaningful conviction, they reinforce 
that domestic violence is unacceptable criminal conduct in 
our society.164  
 Children are secondary victims often dropped from 
this discussion. Each year, between three and ten million 
children witness one parent abusing or killing the 
other.165 Many are injured while trying to protect a 
parent, or are used as pawns or shields in abusive 
relationships.166 Children are born with birth defects 
because their mothers were battered during pregnancy.167 
Studies reveal that a child's exposure to the father 
abusing the mother is a risk factor for transmitting 
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violent behavior from one generation to the next.168 In 
Indiana, 63% of juveniles serving time in jail for murder 
are there for killing an abusive father, step-father, or 
mother's live-in boyfriend in an attempt to protect their 
mother.169 
 Shockingly, dating violence and abuse can start by 
age eleven, according to a study that included sexual 
assault, physical, emotional, and verbal abuse.170 In fact, 
one in five of thirteen- to fourteen-year-olds in 
relationships reported they know friends and peers who 
have been struck in anger by a boyfriend or girlfriend.171 
 Further, the pattern of repeated abuse makes 
domestic violence calls particularly dangerous for law 
enforcement. Because victims of domestic violence 
typically wait to call police until after repeated assaults, 
officers are in an even more dangerous situation when 
they do respond.172 In 2017, more officers were shot 
responding to domestic violence than any other type of 
firearm-related fatality.173 
 Lastly, “batterers are ‘master manipulators.’”174 
They will do anything to convince their victims to get the 
prosecution to drop the charges or secure their victims’ 
unavailability through coercive and controlling means. In 
my job, I could daily listen to inmates’ calls to their 
victims where abusers’ pleas range from threatening 
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retaliation to sweet-talking with promises of reform. I 
have heard the coordination with abusers’ family 
members to threaten victims. Abusers have secured 
alternative-living arrangements for their victims with 
family members who could keep watch. They convince 
victims to leave town, so they can ignore subpoenas. They 
warn for the loss of the family income, and therefore, the 
ability to care for children. They plan exactly what the 
victim will say in her recantation. If the case, nonetheless, 
makes it to trial, their lawyers then try to convince the 
judge or jury that the whole thing was the victim's fault, 
that she attacked him, or that she is just “crazy.”  
 “Prosecutors watch with practiced patience as these 
vulnerable victims succumb to their batterers' 
intimidation and manipulation.”175 To fill the gap between 
the criminal law and the realities of domestic violence, we 
must devise rules of evidence that prosecutors in this 
distinct situation can work with.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Domestic violence creates a unique type of 
prosecution where physical evidence may be lacking and 
the victim often recants, refuses to cooperate, or is made 
unavailable. Difficult prosecutions can be linked to an 
increase in the already-disturbing domestic violence 
statistics. Amending Rule 404 to admit prior acts evidence 
in domestic violence prosecutions allows finders of fact to 
consider past acts to provide context to the controlling and 
cyclical nature of an abusive relationship—and to show a 
propensity to batter. Enacting such a rule provides a 
lifeline to prosecutors facing abundant obstacles in 
domestic violence cases while safeguarding defendants’ 
rights in a manner consistent with the Constitution. This 
proposal is not a novel idea. Other states have created 
exceptions of their own. The next logical step for Indiana 
(and other states) is to adopt a rule similar to the 
described.  
 Before closing, I want to turn to the broader and 
more fundamental problem that reformers face in trying 
to achieve progress—when both sides reveal disturbing 
truths. On one side, we see under-reporting, under-
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enforcement, and inadequacy of punishment in domestic 
violence prosecutions that lead to conviction. All that is 
true and exists to an alarming degree. But, as proponents 
for this type of legislation, we must be equally willing to 
acknowledge the opposing dynamic that exists side-by-
side with that neglect—a criminal justice system plagued 
by race bias and class bias in enforcement, an inadequate 
prison system, and rigidity and disproportionality in 
punishment.176 The challenge for successful reform is to 
find ways we can maintain and strengthen our 
commitment to fairness, while also giving victims the 
protection they need from violence so prevalent in the 
world today.177  
 Nonetheless, these truths, coupled with the 
continual and escalatory nature of domestic violence, all 
occurring within the contours of a society where women 
are still unequal and the overwhelming majority of 
victims of these crimes, makes domestic violence a 
decisive candidate for a categorical exception to the 
general prohibition on the admissibility of prior acts 
evidence in criminal prosecutions. 
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